Files

250 lines
17 KiB
Markdown
Raw Permalink Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters

This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.

# Findings about the skill, from measuring it
Everything here is a result about **the skill**, not about the target. Each item names the evidence
that produced it and its strength.
---
## F1 — The Coverage claim was partly aspirational, and the pass identified exactly which part
`SKILL.md`'s Coverage section lists as *covered by verified mechanisms*:
> Flutter / Dart AOT: pinning the engine version, decoding the object pool, locating and patching
> business logic inside `libapp.so` (`dart-aot.md`).
Measured against a real Dart 3.6.0 `libapp.so`, that sentence splits into three claims of very
different standing:
| Sub-claim | Standing after this pass |
|---|---|
| pinning the engine version | **verified** — the banner route (§1) is correct and 3.6.0 is confirmed three ways |
| decoding the object pool | **false as written** — the kit cannot do it; there is no resolver |
| locating business logic inside `libapp.so` | **true, but conditional** — it works, on top of an external snapshot dumper that the skill neither ships nor installs |
The worked example in `TOOL-VERDICTS.md` shows both halves at once: the chain
`"showRewardAdProvider"` → `pp+0x23548` → ref site `0x7a9464` → `ShowRewardAdFamily.call_2f28ac
@ 0x7a93ec` succeeded, and step 1 was performed by blutter, not by the skill.
The reason is structural, not a shortage of effort: `dart_pool_strings.py` reports **file offsets**
while `pp.txt` and `dart_pprefs.py` work in **pool offsets**. Over the 4,241 strings present in both
spaces there are **4,237 distinct deltas** (min −1,361,429, max +277,654). The mapping is a property
of the reconstructed pool and is not a constant, so no amount of care inside the script recovers it.
Capabilities the kit does not have, stated plainly: snapshot/object-pool deserialisation; symbol and
name recovery; a real call graph (the `--build-index` index holds raw `B`/`BL` targets only); a
decompiler; a function boundary/size table.
---
## F2 — Two scripts fail in the way that reads as a target finding (the P26 class)
The handover singled out `pitfalls.md` P26: *"a self-built analysis script fails in a way that reads
as a target finding."* This pass produced two live instances of exactly that, which is why the P26
warning earns its place.
**`elf_plt.py` returned a confident false negative.** It reports 3,437 stubs where `.rela.plt` holds
3,438, and answers `0x587060 -> not a resolved stub` for an entry that is a legitimate stub for
`dl_iterate_phdr`, with a real caller at `0x576a2c`. Nothing in the output indicates a problem. For
the script's stated purpose — deciding whether a hardening symbol exists in a library — the wrong
answer is indistinguishable from the right one.
**`find_refs.py` returned a clean empty result for input it could not read.** Its docstring advertised
"a smali tree or a directory of dex files"; `iter_files()` accepted only `.smali`. Given the dex
directory it printed `[total refs] 0`, exited **1**, and emitted no warning. This is worse than a
crash: it is the exact input to "nothing references this, safe to patch", produced by the very tool
recommended for judging blast radius before patching.
Re-measured later: the exit code recorded in this section was **0** and it is **1** — the `total == 0`
path has always returned 1. The correction matters because it moves the defect from "no signal at
all" to "the signal was there and the text contradicted it": the note diagnosed the *needle* and never
named the *input form*, so a caller reading the message was still sent the wrong way. Fixed and
re-verified; see F9 for what measuring it turned up underneath.
Both, plus `dart_pprefs.py`'s silently dropped double constants, share one property: **the failure is
one-sided and quiet.** None of the three reports reduced confidence in its own output.
---
## F3 — Defects found, ranked by consequence
| # | Script | Defect | Consequence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `find_refs.py` | `iter_files()` matched only `.smali`; a dex dir yielded 0 results and a direct dex was regex-scanned as text | silent false "no references" on the tool whose job is blast-radius | **fixed, re-verified against a fixture and the real target** |
| 2 | `elf_plt.py` | loop bound `off < fsz - 16` misses the final stub slot | false negative for one real symbol per library, conditionally | **fixed on a copy, re-verified** |
| 3 | `dart_pprefs.py` | only the GP register file is decoded; `ldr dD,[x27,#imm]` (`0xFD400000`) and all double constants lost | under-reports pool references (302 displacements / 1,802 sites here), which breaks the "count refs to judge importance" advice in `dart-aot.md` §9/§10 — one site went `[0 refs]` → `[79 refs]` | **fixed on a copy; agrees with capstone 0/0** |
| 4 | `so_constpatch.py` | rebuild drops the zip `extra` field, destroying 4 KB alignment | for `extractNativeLibs=false` APKs the output will not load; masked here because this target is DEFLATED + `extractNativeLibs=true` | **cause identified, proven by fixture; not fixed** |
| 5 | `so_constpatch.py` | `--diff --name-regions` compares file offset with vaddr | feature completely inert on libraries where `p_vaddr != p_offset` (2 of 36 here), with no warning | cause identified |
| 6 | `so_constpatch.py` | `external_attr` rewritten on 1982/1982 entries | metadata-based integrity comparison detects the rebuild | cause identified |
| 7 | `dexutil.py` | switch payloads decoded as instructions; `decode()` does not resolve operands | caused a spurious "desync likely" verdict on `saveToLocal` | cause identified |
| 8 | `so_constpatch.py` | "N byte(s) changed" is the overwrite window, not bytes changed | overstates change count (13 reported vs 7 actual) | cause identified |
| 9 | `lib_map.py` | `?` means both "read failed" and "not probed" | a real read failure is invisible | cause identified |
| 10 | `dart_pool_strings.py` | TSV escaping is lossy for LF/CR/TAB | 7 of 18,363 rows ambiguous; 19 entries genuinely contain those bytes | cause identified |
| 11 | `elf_plt.py` | `size = 16 if ... else 16` | dead code | cause identified |
| 12 | `dex_strings.py` | `--per-file` prints only files with hits | can be misread as "only this dex was scanned" | cause identified |
Items 1-3 are the ones that changed a conclusion during this pass rather than merely being noticed.
---
## F4 — Documentation contradictions
Independently found while mapping the skill and while using it. The executable cross-reference
checkers (`check_refs.py`, `check_repo.py`) pass, so these are invisible to the repo's own gates.
| # | Location | Problem |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | `dart-aot.md` §2 | Claims blutter's `asm/` has *no instructions* — "Do not plan around it." **Wrong.** One plugin file under `asm/<plugin>/src/ads/reward/` is 1,327 lines carrying class layouts, signatures, a full instruction listing, pool annotations and resolved call targets. It is the richest artifact in the chain and the doc says to ignore it. |
| 2 | `dart-aot.md` §2 | Budgets "tens of minutes" for the first blutter build; measured **≈78 s** (~30× pessimistic). Also demands a very recent C++ compiler; **MSVC 19.34 (Nov 2022) suffices**. |
| 3 | `dart-aot.md` §7 | Presents two-byte hit chaining as an acceptance test. On this sample, 9,840 two-byte CJK candidates yield 2,081 chained runs, all garbage. |
| 4 | `signature-derived-keys.md:61` | Documents `python scripts/sig_probe.py --live --pkg <pkg>` — the script has no `--pkg`; it takes `--live PKG`. Line 54 and `pitfalls.md` P27 give the correct form. |
| 5 | `dart-aot.md:204` | `dart_disasm.py ... --index callers.json --build-index` omits the required argument value; argparse errors out. |
| 6 | `byte-level-patching.md:186` | Says different-length strings "need `dex_strpatch`-class tooling", while `dex_strpatch.py` requires `len(new) == len(old)` — it is precisely the tool that cannot do this. Contradicts `dex-patching.md:123`. |
| 7 | Coverage vs `toolchain.md` | Coverage lists Unity/IL2CPP logic recovery as **not covered**, but `toolchain.md` Tier 4 names concrete tooling without pointing back at that disclaimer, so a reader of `toolchain.md` alone would take IL2CPP for a supported route. |
| 8 | Script count | `SKILL.md`/`README.md` index 35 rows, which is 34 scripts plus the `scripts/dexpatch/` directory row. |
| 9 | `dart_pool_strings.py` docstring | Says two-byte auto-detection is unreliable (confirmed here); `dart-aot.md` §7 treats UTF-16LE hits as a reliable rule. |
| 10 | `verification.md` rung 7 | Re-downloading a distributed file to compare hashes has no landing place in `SKILL.md`'s six "done" criteria, so the two sections disagree on strength. |
Item 1 is the most damaging because it steers a reader away from the best available evidence.
---
## F5 — "verified mechanisms" left no reproducible trace in the repo
The Coverage preamble frames its list as *verified mechanisms*, and `references/long-task-discipline.md`
defines **Observed** as *"reproduced it, with the exact command and output"*. The repository contains
no sample, no fixture, no captured log or screenshot, no patch record, no test and no CI, and its
`README.md` states it holds no target-specific data.
So the strongest support the repository itself can exhibit for those claims is *Inferred*. This is
**not** an accusation that the claims are false — several were confirmed here on the first attempt,
and `dart-aot.md` §1 proved exactly right. It is a statement about evidentiary standing: the repo
asks its readers to label their own claims and does not leave itself a way to meet its own bar.
The concrete measurement figures that *are* reproducible are the 14 sample-scoped numbers listed in
the skill map (e.g. dex 4.32 MB → 7.73 MB; `.RSA` 1199 B vs 777 B at runtime; a log tag going `8 → 0`).
---
## F6 — Boundary evidence: where the skill's method held, and where it ran out
This is the observation the pass was built to produce, so it is stated as a sequence rather than a
verdict.
**Held, unchanged:** manifest and packer triage; multi-dex string/class recon at 27.6 MB across four
dex files (`dex_strings.py`, `dexutil.py`); native ELF import mapping at scale (36,974 relocations);
live-process library mapping; equal-length `.so` constant patching; the launch-timeline methodology
(`coldstart.py`); the P26 discipline itself — checking whether a tool was ever able to answer before
reading its silence as a finding, which is what turned the blutter crash from a false "unusable" into
a corrected "works after a relink".
**Ran out:** from the Dart snapshot inward. Everything past `pp.txt` is fine; getting *to* `pp.txt`
from the binary requires a container resolver the kit does not have. That is one dependency, not a
subject area.
**Not exercised at all:** packers, code virtualization, custom linkers, integrity-check redirection,
tamper-triggered suicide. This target has none of those, and the unmodified app's own startup failure
also removes the repack loop those scenarios need.
---
## F7 — A trap in this specific environment that will produce false confirmations
`androguard` 4.x (the version installed here) has **four independent reference-analysis failures on
this sample**: `get_xref_from()` returns 0 for everything, including `AdLoader.loadAd()V` which has
20+ callers by other means; `get_ref()` raises; a full `get_operands()` sweep returns 0 strings.
Anyone who reaches for androguard to double-check a "zero references" conclusion will get **zero, and
therefore agreement**. The zero-reference result in `TARGET-FACTS.md` does not come from androguard;
it comes from `dexutil.py` plus raw-byte re-checks of the bodies that would not decode cleanly. This
is worth a line in the environment documentation because it is a tool that lies in the direction of
the hypothesis being tested.
---
## F8 — Reconciling the two failures: a genuine but unproven loader signal
Recorded as a boundary between what was established and what was guessed, because collapsing them
would be its own error.
The launch does show non-standard startup plumbing (observed):
- `E LoaderLog: 10026 / 101004` on the device, `10020 / 101003` on the emulator — an SDK-side
loader logging numeric status codes
- `E Instrumentation: Uninitialized ActivityThread, likely app-created Instrumentation, disabling
AppComponentFactory` — the process is not taking the ordinary `ActivityThread` path
- `E <PKG-truncated>: Unknown bits set in runtime_flags: 0x40000000` (logcat truncates the tag to 23
characters, so the package name appears clipped in this line)
And yet the dex-side packer verdict is clean: no hardening library in the native set, an ordinary
`application android:name` (the app's own class, not a packer stub), no known packer markers. Those two
observations sit in tension.
**Not resolved.** The `LoaderLog` emitter was not attributed to a specific class — the string exists
in `classes2.dex` and `classes3.dex` but the classes that declare it are third-party, and this pass
did not trace the call chain. Whether this plumbing is a benign logging SDK, part of the Flutter
plugin bootstrap, or a light-weight loader contributing to the abort is **unverified**. Stating it
as established would be exactly the kind of overreach this report is trying to document.
---
## F9 — Fixing F2 exposed a deeper one: the dex opcode table was shifted, and nine widths were wrong
Fixing `find_refs.py`'s dex path means depending on `dexutil.decode()`'s boundaries being right, so
that was measured rather than assumed. It was not right: on a real 8.9 MB dex, **65 of 50,791 method
bodies did not decode to their declared boundary**, and **32 carried an operand index outside the
table it indexes**.
The cause is a run of `OP_NAMES` and `insn_units` shifted by one from `0x16` to `0x2C`:
| opcode | specification says | the repository had | width: spec vs repo |
|---|---|---|---|
| `0x17` | `const-wide/32` (31i) | `const-wide/16` | **3 vs 2** |
| `0x18` | `const-wide` (51l) | `const-wide/32` | **5 vs 3** |
| `0x1B` | `const-string/jumbo` (31c) | `const-class` | **3 vs 2** |
| `0x1C` | `const-class` (21c) | `monitor-enter` | **2 vs 1** |
| `0x1E` | `monitor-exit` (11x) | `check-cast` | **1 vs 2** |
| `0x20` | `instance-of` (22c) | `array-length` | **2 vs 1** |
| `0x21` | `array-length` (12x) | `new-instance` | **1 vs 2** |
| `0x23` | `new-array` (22c) | `filled-new-array` | **2 vs 3** |
| `0x26` | `fill-array-data` (31t) | `throw` | **3 vs 1** |
| `0x2C` | `sparse-switch` (31t) | *(absent)* | **3 vs 2** |
Plus `0xFA`-`0xFF` (`invoke-polymorphic`, `invoke-custom`, `const-method-handle`,
`const-method-type`), absent from the width logic and defaulting to one unit each where the
specification has 4, 4, 3, 3, 2, 2.
The `goto` family went with it: `branch_target()` computed a branch target for `0x27`, which is
`throw`, and read the offset width one opcode early for the rest. `dex_find_insn.py`'s kind map
carried the same shift in its `goto` and `switch` entries, so a semantic search for a branch matched
the wrong instructions.
That this survived an earlier "fix instruction widths" pass is not surprising in hindsight:
`insn_units` ended with `if op == 0x29: # measured: this slot is goto/16 (20t)` — the shape of a
repair made one observation at a time, where the width of `0x29` was corrected without checking the
opcode's *name* against a specification. Name and width were wrong together and consistently, which
is exactly why the decode still looked plausible.
**How it was settled.** Not by reading the table again, but by two measurements that do not depend on
this project's code:
1. **Self-consistency at scale.** A real dex is a stream ART can execute, so a correct decoder must
land every method body exactly on `insns_off + insns_size*2`. 65 did not. After the fix,
**50,791 of 50,791 do, with 0 illegal operand indices.**
2. **A second decoder.** `androguard` 4.1.4 decoded the same dex independently. Aligned by method
order, the per-instruction width sequences are **identical for all 50,791 bodies — 0 differing.**
Names and widths now come from the format specification's table, and width is a lookup (`OP_UNITS`)
rather than a chain of range tests, which is the shape that made this class of error possible.
**Two things this pass did not fix, recorded so they are not mistaken for clean:**
- **`dexutil.string()` decodes MUTF-8 with `errors="replace"`.** Identifiers containing non-BMP
characters decode to U+FFFD — this sample has them, and one crashed a `print` with a
`UnicodeEncodeError` on a non-BMP codepoint. A class name read from the dex may therefore not
compare equal to the same name read from another tool. It does not affect instruction decoding or a
descriptor-based needle, but it is why the cross-check above had to align by order rather than by
key.
- `OP_NAMES` had no entry for roughly 150 valid opcodes (`aget`/`aput`, the `cmp` family, the
`neg`/`not`/conversion unops, the arithmetic and `lit8`/`lit16` families). They decoded correctly by
fallback but printed as `op_XX`. The regenerated table covers 224 opcodes.