3.3 KiB
name, description, domain, subdomain, tags, version, author, license, mitre_attack, d3fend, references
| name | description | domain | subdomain | tags | version | author | license | mitre_attack | d3fend | references | ||||||||||
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| analyzing-authenticode-signatures | Analyzes Windows Authenticode signatures on PE files: checking for a signature, reading the signer certificate chain, detecting revoked/expired/stolen certs, and recognizing signature-stripping and catalog-signing abuse. Activates for requests to analyze a code signature, verify Authenticode, or assess signer trust on a PE. | cybersecurity | malware-analysis |
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1.0.0 | analyst-ai-pack | Apache-2.0 |
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Analyzing Authenticode Signatures
When to Use
- You need to know whether a PE is signed and whether the signer is trustworthy.
- You suspect a stolen/abused code-signing certificate or a forged/invalid signature.
- You are distinguishing legitimately signed software from signed malware.
Do not use "is signed" as "is safe" — adversaries use stolen certs, abuse catalog signing, and append invalid signatures; a valid signature only attests the signer, not benignity.
Prerequisites
- Access to the PE security directory (Python
struct/pefile); on Windows,signtool/PowerShellGet-AuthenticodeSignaturefor authoritative verification.
Safety & Handling
- Parse the signature statically; never execute the sample.
- Keep the sample password-protected at rest and reference it by hash.
Workflow
Step 1: Check for a signature
Read the PE security directory (certificate table). Absent entry = unsigned; present = embedded PKCS#7. Note that valid signing can also be via a catalog file (not embedded).
python scripts/analyst.py check sample.exe
Step 2: Extract signer details
Parse the PKCS#7 to read the signer certificate: subject, issuer, validity dates, and serial. Cross-reference against known-abused/stolen certs.
Step 3: Verify, do not just read
On Windows, verify the signature cryptographically and check revocation
(Get-AuthenticodeSignature). A present-but-invalid signature is a strong red flag.
Step 4: Assess trust in context
Weigh signer reputation, certificate age, and whether the signed file's behavior matches the purported publisher. Treat anomalies (recently issued cert, mismatched publisher) as suspicious.
Validation
- Signature presence is determined from the security directory, and verified (not just read) on Windows.
- Signer certificate details are extracted and checked against abuse intel.
- The trust conclusion accounts for revocation/validity, not mere presence.
Pitfalls
- Equating a present signature with safety; stolen-cert malware is common.
- Missing catalog-signed files by only checking embedded signatures.
- Reading the signature without cryptographically verifying it.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the signature checker. - Authenticode format and the PE/COFF security directory (linked in frontmatter).