reverse-skills-max: initial public release (restored, redacted, hardened)

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# API Reference: Analyzing Java/JAR Malware
## Overview
`scripts/analyst.py` treats a JAR as a ZIP and inventories `.class` files and embedded payloads,
reads the manifest entry point, detects obfuscator fingerprints and name obfuscation, and scans
class constant pools for dangerous API usage. It reads the archive statically, never launches the
JVM, and defangs URLs.
## Dependencies
| Package | Version | Purpose |
|---------|---------|---------|
| (stdlib) | — | zipfile, regex, JSON, file IO |
| CFR / Procyon | optional | decompile recovered classes downstream (not required here) |
## Core functions
### `inspect(path)`
Returns class count, `Main-Class`, embedded payloads, resources, obfuscators, a name-obfuscation
flag, capability APIs, and defanged URLs.
## Capability APIs flagged
`Runtime`/`ProcessBuilder` (exec), `java.lang.reflect` + `URLClassLoader` (reflective loading),
`javax.crypto` (encryption), `java.net.Socket`/`URL` (networking), `java.awt.Robot` (surveillance).
## Usage
```bash
python scripts/analyst.py inspect sample.jar
```
## Sources
- JVM specification (class file format, constant pool) — https://docs.oracle.com/javase/specs/jvms/se17/html/
- JAR/ZIP structure and `MANIFEST.MF` `Main-Class` from the Java platform documentation
- Obfuscator fingerprints (Allatori/ProGuard/Zelix) from public Java-malware analyses