reverse-skills-max: initial public release (restored, redacted, hardened)
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name: competition-relay-coercion-chain
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description: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for forced-auth coercion, relay chains, target selection, NTLM or related acceptance paths, and coercion-to-privilege transitions. Use when the user asks to trace a coercion primitive, follow a relay path, analyze forced authentication, determine which service accepts relayed auth, or connect a coercion step to resulting privilege, enrollment, or code execution. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.
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# Competition Relay Coercion Chain
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Use this skill only as a downstream specialization after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` is already active and has established sandbox assumptions, node ownership, and evidence priorities. If that has not happened yet, return to `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` first.
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Use this skill when the hard part is proving the full chain from forced authentication to a service that actually accepts the relayed identity.
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Reply in Simplified Chinese unless the user explicitly requests English.
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## Quick Start
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1. Split the chain into coercion source, captured auth, relay target, acceptance point, and resulting effect.
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2. Record transport, protocol, and service identity at each hop.
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3. Separate forced-auth generation from relay success and from downstream privilege.
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4. Keep coercion trigger, relay transcript, and accepting service in one evidence chain.
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5. Reproduce the smallest coercion-to-acceptance path that proves the decisive edge.
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## Workflow
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### 1. Map The Coercion Source
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- Identify the service, RPC, file path, printer path, WebDAV edge, or protocol trigger that forces authentication.
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- Record source host, coerced principal, transport, and any environmental preconditions.
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- Keep one compact note of exactly what causes the auth to leave the source.
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### 2. Trace The Relay Target
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- Record where the authentication lands, how it is forwarded, and which protocol or service consumes it.
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- Distinguish capture-only, replay-only, and actual relay acceptance.
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- Keep service name, target host, protocol, relay transcript, and acceptance response tied together.
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### 3. Reduce To The Decisive Relay Chain
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- Compress the result to the smallest sequence: coercion trigger -> relayed auth -> accepted service -> resulting privilege or artifact.
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- State clearly whether the decisive weakness lives in the coercion source, the relay target, signing settings, or the accepted downstream service.
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- If the path ultimately becomes a certificate-enrollment issue or a pure Kerberos delegation edge, hand off to the tighter specialized skill.
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## Read This Reference
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- Load `references/relay-coercion-chain.md` for the coercion checklist, relay checklist, and evidence packaging.
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## What To Preserve
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- Coercion trigger details, source host, coerced identity, target host, accepting service, and resulting effect
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- Relay transcripts, error or acceptance responses, and the exact protocol used at each hop
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- The smallest replayable coercion-to-acceptance sequence
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interface:
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display_name: "Competition Relay Coercion Chain"
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short_description: "Trace coercion, relay targets, and accepted auth edges"
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default_prompt: "After $ctf-sandbox-orchestrator is active, use $competition-relay-coercion-chain to trace the coercion step, relay target, and accepted authentication edge in this challenge."
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policy:
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allow_implicit_invocation: false
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# Relay Coercion Checklist
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## Chain Segments
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- Coercion source and trigger
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- Captured or forwarded authentication
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- Relay target and protocol
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- Acceptance point and resulting effect
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## Reconstruction Order
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1. What triggers the source to authenticate
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2. Which identity leaves the source
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3. Where that authentication is relayed
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4. Which service actually accepts it
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5. What privilege, enrollment, or artifact results
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## Evidence To Keep Together
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- Source side: host, service, trigger, protocol, coerced principal
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- Relay side: listener, transcript, target host, protocol, response
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- Effect side: accepted service, resulting account effect, privilege, or issued artifact
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## Common Pitfalls
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- Stopping at “forced auth happened” without proving relay acceptance
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- Proving relay acceptance without showing what capability it produced
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- Mixing several candidate relay targets without isolating the one that actually accepted the relayed auth
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