reverse-skills-max: initial public release (restored, redacted, hardened)
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name: competition-kernel-container-escape
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description: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for kernel attack surface, namespace and cgroup boundaries, container isolation assumptions, syscall paths, and escape primitive verification. Use when the user asks to analyze container-to-host escape paths, kernel exploit prerequisites, namespace crossover, capability misuse, or prove whether an exploit primitive crosses the sandbox boundary. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.
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# Competition Kernel Container Escape
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Use this skill only as a downstream specialization after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` is already active and has established sandbox assumptions, node ownership, and evidence priorities. If that has not happened yet, return to `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` first.
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Use this skill when the decisive step is proving a boundary crossing between containerized context and host or higher-privilege kernel context.
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Reply in Simplified Chinese unless the user explicitly requests English.
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## Quick Start
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1. Map runtime isolation first: namespaces, cgroups, seccomp, capabilities, LSM, and mount boundaries.
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2. Separate exploit prerequisite, primitive, and boundary-crossing proof.
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3. Record kernel version, config hints, runtime options, and reachable syscall surface.
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4. Keep instrumented observations separate from pristine challenge path.
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5. Reproduce one minimal primitive-to-boundary-crossing chain.
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## Workflow
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### 1. Map Isolation And Kernel Surface
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- Record namespace map, cgroup mode, capabilities, seccomp profile, AppArmor or SELinux state, mounted filesystems, and runtime sockets.
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- Note kernel version, distro build hints, module exposure, and container runtime behavior.
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- Keep host and container observations linked to exact node and context.
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### 2. Prove Exploit Primitive And Crossover
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- Show controllable input, trigger condition, affected object, and observable kernel or runtime state change.
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- Capture before and after identity, namespace, mount, or process visibility to prove boundary crossing.
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- Distinguish crash-only behavior from stable capability gain.
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### 3. Reduce To Decisive Escape Chain
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- Compress to: prerequisite state -> primitive trigger -> boundary crossing evidence -> resulting host-level capability.
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- State whether root cause is kernel vulnerability, runtime misconfiguration, capability overgrant, or namespace leak.
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- If path relies mostly on credential replay after initial foothold, hand off to Linux credential pivot skill.
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## Read This Reference
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- Load `references/kernel-container-escape.md` for isolation checklist, primitive checklist, and parity guidance.
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## What To Preserve
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- Kernel and runtime context, capability set, seccomp or LSM state, and namespace map
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- Primitive trigger data, boundary crossing evidence, and resulting capability
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- One minimal reproducible chain from container context to host-relevant effect
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interface:
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display_name: "Competition Kernel Container Escape"
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short_description: "Map kernel and container boundaries to prove escape primitives"
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default_prompt: "After $ctf-sandbox-orchestrator is active, use $competition-kernel-container-escape to map kernel and container boundaries and prove the decisive escape primitive."
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policy:
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allow_implicit_invocation: false
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# Kernel Container Escape Checklist
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## First Pass
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- Kernel version, runtime type, namespace map, cgroup mode, capability set
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- Seccomp profile, AppArmor or SELinux mode, mounts, privileged sockets
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- Potential primitives: syscall path, fs boundary, runtime API, namespace leak
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## Chain To Reconstruct
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1. Isolation baseline recorded
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2. Exploit or misconfig primitive triggered
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3. Boundary crossover evidence captured
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4. Host-relevant capability appears
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5. Chain reproduces from reset baseline
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## Evidence To Keep Together
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- Context side: kernel and runtime config, namespace and capability state
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- Primitive side: controllable input, trigger, affected object, observables
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- Effect side: identity change, host visibility, privileged action, persistence edge
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## Common Pitfalls
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- Treating container root as host compromise without crossover proof
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- Mixing several primitives before proving one decisive chain
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- Claiming escape from crash artifacts without stable capability evidence
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