reverse-skills-max: initial public release (restored, redacted, hardened)
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name: competition-kerberos-delegation
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description: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for Kerberos delegation, SPN trust edges, S4U abuse, RBCD, constrained or unconstrained delegation, and service-ticket acceptance. Use when the user asks about constrained delegation, unconstrained delegation, RBCD, S4U, SPNs, ticket acceptance, or how a Kerberos trust edge turns into effective privilege under sandbox assumptions. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.
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# Competition Kerberos Delegation
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Use this skill only as a downstream specialization after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` is already active and has established sandbox assumptions, node ownership, and evidence priorities. If that has not happened yet, return to `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` first.
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Use this skill when the hard part is not "is there Kerberos here," but which delegation edge exists, which ticket is being minted, and which service really accepts it.
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Reply in Simplified Chinese unless the user explicitly requests English.
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## Quick Start
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1. Write the trust chain first: principal -> delegation edge -> ticket type -> target SPN -> accepting service -> resulting privilege.
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2. Separate ticket possession from accepted privilege.
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3. Keep SPNs, delegation mode, PAC/group data, encryption type, and service acceptance in one compact evidence block.
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4. Reproduce one minimal delegation chain before broadening into variants.
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5. Tie every privilege claim to a specific accepted ticket or service-side effect.
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## Workflow
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### 1. Identify The Delegation Edge
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- Determine whether the path is constrained delegation, unconstrained delegation, resource-based constrained delegation, protocol transition, or another trust edge.
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- Inspect SPNs, ACLs, service accounts, SIDHistory, certificate templates, and replication rights only when they affect the active path.
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### 2. Trace Ticket Minting And Acceptance
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- Record TGT/TGS type, S4U steps when relevant, delegation flags, PAC or group data, encryption type, cache location, and target SPN.
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- Prove which service actually accepts the ticket and what capability appears after acceptance.
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### 3. Report The Effective Edge
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- Compress the chain into one replayable path, not a vague "domain compromise" statement.
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- Separate candidate edges from the edge that really lands privilege.
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## Read This Reference
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- Load `references/kerberos-delegation.md` for the delegation checklist, ticket fields to preserve, and common proof mistakes.
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## What To Preserve
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- SPN, ticket type, delegation mode, PAC/group data, encryption type, cache location, accepting service
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- Service-side logs, event IDs, logon session changes, or group changes proving effective privilege
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- The exact trust edge that makes the ticket replayable
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interface:
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display_name: "Competition Kerberos Delegation"
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short_description: "Trace S4U, RBCD, delegation edges, and ticket acceptance"
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default_prompt: "After $ctf-sandbox-orchestrator is active, use $competition-kerberos-delegation to trace delegation edges, minted tickets, and the service that accepts them."
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policy:
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allow_implicit_invocation: false
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# Kerberos Delegation Checklist
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## Write The Chain Explicitly
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- source principal
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- delegation edge
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- ticket minted or transformed
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- target SPN
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- accepting service
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- resulting privilege
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## Ticket Fields To Preserve
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- TGT or TGS type
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- SPN
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- delegation mode
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- S4U step if present
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- PAC or group data
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- encryption type
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- cache location
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- accepting service
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## Trust Edges To Inspect
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- constrained delegation
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- unconstrained delegation
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- resource-based constrained delegation
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- protocol transition
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- SIDHistory or ACL-based privilege edges when they affect ticket usability
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## Common Pitfalls
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- Treating a minted ticket as proof of accepted privilege
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- Reporting the delegation mode without naming the accepting service
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- Expanding into every AD edge before one replayable chain is proven
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