reverse-skills-max: initial public release (restored, redacted, hardened)
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name: competition-agent-cloud
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description: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for AI-agent, prompt-injection, MCP or toolchain, cloud, container, CI/CD, and supply-chain challenges. Use when the user asks to analyze prompt-to-tool flows, retrieval poisoning, mounted secrets, deployment drift, runtime-vs-manifest mismatches, registry provenance, or CI-produced artifacts under sandbox assumptions. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.
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---
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# Competition Agent Cloud
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Use this skill only as a downstream specialization after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` is already active and has established sandbox assumptions, node ownership, and evidence priorities. If that has not happened yet, return to `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` first.
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Use this skill when the challenge path is driven by prompt-to-tool execution, retrieval and memory boundaries, deployment drift, or build and release provenance.
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Reply in Simplified Chinese unless the user explicitly requests English.
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## Quick Start
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1. Decide whether the dominant path is agentic or infrastructure-driven.
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2. Map one minimal control chain: untrusted input -> visible context -> tool or deployment side effect.
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3. Distinguish checked-in intent from live runtime truth.
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4. Keep prompts, tool args, manifests, mounts, and provenance steps in compact evidence blocks.
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5. Reproduce the exploit or misconfiguration with minimal context and minimal instrumentation.
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## Workflow
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### 1. Agent And Prompt Injection
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- Treat prompts, tool schemas, retrieved chunks, planner notes, memory files, and handoffs as challenge artifacts.
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- Prove one minimal chain from untrusted content to model-visible instruction to tool side effect.
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- Distinguish claimed capability from runtime-exposed capability.
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### 2. Cloud, Containers, And CI/CD
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- Split build-time, deploy-time, and runtime.
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- Reconcile compose or kube manifests with live mounts, env, logs, and traffic.
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- Trace provenance from source to dependency resolution to build to publish to runtime consumer.
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## Read This Reference
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- Load `references/agent-cloud.md` for the control-stack checklist, deployment-truth checklist, and evidence packaging.
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- If the task is specifically about prompt-boundary abuse or retrieved-content-to-tool drift, prefer `$competition-prompt-injection`.
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- If the task is specifically about CI, dependency provenance, registry drift, or shipped artifacts, prefer `$competition-supply-chain`.
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- If the task is specifically about queue payloads, async worker drift, retries, or worker-only runtime state, prefer `$competition-queue-worker-drift`.
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- If the task is specifically about SSRF to internal control surfaces, metadata endpoints, or metadata-derived token pivots, prefer `$competition-ssrf-metadata-pivot`.
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- If the task is specifically about proxy-upstream parse differentials, ambiguous headers, path normalization drift, or request smuggling behavior, prefer `$competition-request-normalization-smuggling`.
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- If the task is specifically about metadata-service access, instance or workload identity, link-local token paths, or metadata-derived privilege, prefer `$competition-cloud-metadata-path`.
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- If the task is specifically about kube API permissions, service-account trust, admission behavior, controller drift, or cluster secret exposure, prefer `$competition-k8s-control-plane`.
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- If the task is specifically about live mounts, sidecars, init containers, or runtime-only secret exposure, prefer `$competition-container-runtime`.
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- If the task is specifically about container-to-host boundary crossing, kernel-surface prerequisites, or escape primitive verification, prefer `$competition-kernel-container-escape`.
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## What To Preserve
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- Prompt snippets, retrieved chunks, planner transitions, and final tool args
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- Compose or Kubernetes fragments tied to live mounts or routes
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- Artifact hashes, dependency drift, CI steps, and the resulting runtime consumer
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interface:
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display_name: "Competition Agent Cloud"
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short_description: "Trace prompt-to-tool flow, deployment drift, and provenance"
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default_prompt: "After $ctf-sandbox-orchestrator is active, use $competition-agent-cloud to trace prompt-to-tool flow, deployment drift, mounted secrets, or artifact provenance in this challenge."
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policy:
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allow_implicit_invocation: false
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# Agent, Toolchain, Cloud, And Supply-Chain Checklist
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## Agentic Path
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- Map instruction layers, retrieval layers, memory layers, tool gates, auth material, and side effects
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- Keep one compact evidence block for prompts, retrieved text, planner drift, tool arguments, and side effect
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- Prove one minimal exploit chain before exploring variants
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## Cloud And Container Path
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- Compare checked-in manifests to live mounts, env, sidecars, and logs
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- Treat metadata services, registries, message buses, object stores, and IAM-like identities as sandbox control surfaces when they appear in-path
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- Track build-time, deploy-time, and runtime separately
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## Supply Chain
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- Keep a compact provenance chain: source -> dependency resolution -> build -> package/sign -> publish -> runtime consumer
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- Focus on version drift, registry pulls, generated artifacts, and final runtime hook points
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## Common Pitfalls
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- Trusting a prompt string without runtime confirmation
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- Treating checked-in manifests as deployment truth
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- Missing the point where retrieved content becomes executable tool input
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